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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
All parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. Appellant, the Plaintiff
below, is Ilia Dennis. Appellee, the Defendant below, is David Vasquez.
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3. This is an appeal by PlaintifffAppellant from afinalorder granting summary
judgment in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding that the claims preclusion

branch of res judicata prevents Appellant from bringing a subsequent claim for personal
injury after first losing on the merits in small claims court in a property damage claim with
both claims arising out of the same automobile accident?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 56; Ault v. Holden. 44 P.3d 781, 787 (Utah 2002).
The reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any grounds
available to the trial court even if it is not one relied upon below. Higgins v. Salt Lake
County. 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993).
In an appeal from a summary judgment the Court may reject arguments not made at
the trial level. Olson v. Park & Craig Olsen. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 23, 2001, Ilia Dennis (hereinafter "Dennis"), while represented by
counsel (R. 65; Addendum A), filed a small claims action against Appellee David Vasquez
(hereinafter "Vasquez") (Case No. 01820063) (Addendum B) to collect property damages
arising out of an automobile collision which occurred on October 6, 2000. (R. 20.) At the
small claims hearing the court entered a judgment of "no cause of action." (R. 20;
Addendum C.)
Dennis brought this action on July 26, 2001 in the Third District Court for personal
injuries claimed to be sustained in the same motor vehicle accident with Vasquez occurring
on October 6, 2000. (R. 2.)
Vasquez filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the res judicata
barred Dennis from splitting his cause of actions and filing a lawsuit twice for the same
accident. (R. 27-39.) Specifically, it was argued that the claims preclusion branch of res
judicata was a bar to Dennis bringing a second lawsuit based upon the same accident and
occurrence.

2

Dennis argued that the elements of the claims preclusion branch of res judicata had
not been met. (R. 40-47.) Dennis alleged that the judgment of the small claims court was
not on the merits and further argued that negligence issues had not been litigated. (R. 40-47,
95.)
On March 22,2002, the Third District Court issued a memorandum decision granting
the motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of the claims preclusion branch of
res judicata and held that Dennis' claim was therefore barred. (R. 74-78.) On May 6,2002,
the court entered an order granting summary judgment based upon its memorandum decision.
(R. 79-83; Addendum D.) Dennis filed a notice of appeal on May 24, 2002. (R. 84-85.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On October 6, 2000, Dennis was involved in an automobile collision with

Vasquez at the intersection of 14400 South and Pony Express Road in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. As a result of the collision Dennis claims he sustained bodily injuries and
property damage to his vehicle. (R. 2-3; Addendum B)
2.

On February 23,2001, Dennis, with his counsel's paralegal present (R. 95, p.

13, lines 9-22) filed a small claims action for property damage arising out of the October 6,
2000, collision with Dennis. (Addendum B)

3

3.

Dennis was at all times represented by counsel for the accident of October 6,

2000. The attorney's paralegal went with Dennis to the small claims trial. (R. 65; R. 95, p.
2, lines 20-25; p. 3, lines 1-8; p. 12, lines 10-25; p. 13, lines 1-25.)
4.

On March 29, 2001, the small claims court entered judgment indicating "no

cause of action" against Dennis and in favor of Vasquez. (R. 30; Addendum C.)
5.

At the time the small claims lawsuit was filed on March 29,2001, Dennis had

already completed his medical treatment for the October 6, 2000, accident as of December
22, 2000. (R. 66; Addendum E.)1
6.

Vasquez did not file any appeal from the small claims judgment. (R. 1-95.)

7.

On July 19,2001, Dennisfiled,with "of counsel" of the same firm he had at

the time of the small claims trial, a second lawsuit, this time claiming personal injury
damages. (R. 1-4, 65, 95.)

1

Addendum E was served on Vasquez in this lawsuit as part of Dennis' initial
disclosures on November 30, 2002. (R. 16,46.) Addendum E is a summary of medical
expenses incurred by Dennis for treatment as of November 30, 2001, when the initial
disclosures were served. Dennis' medical expenses as shown in Addendum E clearly
indicate the last medical treatment Dennis received was on December 22, 2000. The
treatment claimed as the medical expenses incurred in the present lawsuit already existed
and had been incurred at the time Dennisfiledhis small claims action on February 23,
2001.) (Addendum B,E.)
4

8.

On December 12,2001, a motion for summary judgment was filed by Vasquez

claiming Dennis' claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Under the claims
preclusion branch of res judicata Dennis argued the small claims judgment was final and on
the merits, that the parties were identical, and that all of Dennis' claimsfromthe October 6,
2000, accident could have and should have beenfiledin one lawsuit at the same time. (R.
27-47.)
9.

On December 24, 2001, Dennis filed his opposition arguing that the issues

were not identical, the small claims judgment was not final, and that equity principles
applied. (R. 40-47.)
10.

A hearing with argument was held at the trial court on March 18, 2002. (R.

11.

On March 22,2002, the trial court issued a memorandum decision granting the

95.)

Vasquez's motion for summary judgment. (R. 74-78.)
12.

The court entered afinalorder which wasfiledon March 23,2002. (R. 79-82;

Addendum D.) Dennis filed a notice of appeal on May 23, 2002. (R. 84-85.)

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Dennis brought two separate actions, one for property damage and the other for
personal injuries. Both actions arose out of the same automobile accident of October 6,
2000.
At the time Dennis brought his small claims action on February 23, 2001, he was
represented by counsel and had completed his medical treatment for the accident. (R. 65,
66.) The Small Claims Court entered a judgment indicating "no cause of action." However,
Dennis failed to combine into one lawsuit his claims for personal injury and property
damage.
Dennis thereafter filed this action in the Third District Court in which the court
granted summary judgment on the grounds of claims preclusion.
Under Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), the claims preclusion branch
of res judicata bars the present action for personal injuries because (1) both cases involve the
same parties; (2) Dennis could have brought in a court of competent jurisdiction both the
personal injury and the property damage claims; and (3) the small claims court entered a
judgment for "no cause of action" which became a final judgment on the merits.
Dennis' argument about an "equity" exception does not apply as Dennis had a legal
remedy to file in a court of competent jurisdiction and failed to do so. This is not a case
6

similar to authority cited in Dennis' brief where no attorneys are allowed in Small Claims
Court and Dennis brought an action before medical bills were incurred. The opposite is true.
Dennis was represented and had fully completed treatment prior to filing the small claims
action for personal injuries. Instead of filing the appropriate lawsuit for all claims Dennis
attempted to make a claim on property damage already resolved. It was an attempt by Dennis
to misuse the courts that has caused his claims to be barred rather than some unjust system.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS PRECLUSION BRANCH OF RES
JUDICATA.

Dennis failed to assert his claim for bodily injury in the Small Claims Court
proceeding. Dennis is barred by the res judicata branch known as claim preclusion.
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that cause of action
is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy the following requirements:
1.

Both cases must involve the same parties or their privies;

2.

The claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit
or must have been one that could and should have been raised in the first
action; and

3.

The first suit must have resulted in afinaljudgment on the merits.
7

Madsen v. Borthick, supra. (Emphasis added).
A.

Both Lawsuits Involved The Same Parties Or Their Privies

The first element requiring that both cases involve the same parties or their privies is
unquestionably met in the subject case. Ilia Dennis was the Plaintiff and David Vasquez was
the Defendant in both lawsuits filed in district court and the lawsuit filed in Small Claims
Court. Both cases arise out the events of the October 6, 2000, automobile accident.
B.

The Third District Court Lawsuit For Personal Injuries Could Have And
Should Have Been Brought At The Time The Small Claims Lawsuit Was
Contemplated

The second element of Madsen. supra., requiring that the claim alleged to be barred
must have been either (1) presented in the first suit, or (2) must be one that should and could
have been raised in the first action, has also been met.
Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988),
defines a claim or cause of action as:
A claim is the situation or state of facts which entitles a party to sustain
an action and gives them the right to seek judicial interference on his
behalf. A claim petitions a court to award a remedy for injury suffered
by the plaintiff. A cause of action is necessarily comprised of specific
elements which must be proven before relief is granted. A claim or
cause of action is resolved by judicial pronouncement providing or
denying the requested remedy.

8

Dennis' claims for personal injury were not asserted in the small claims action. The
small claims lawsuit specifically requests damages for property. (Addendum B.) However,
the injury claims could and should have been raised because they arosefromthe same events
and occurrences as the property damage claim. Utah courts have specifically held that small
claims courts have subject matter jurisdiction over personal injury claims. Kawamoto v.
Fratto, 994 P.2d 187 (Utah 2000). Furthermore, the action could have been brought in the
district court combining all the damages soughtfromthe one accident.
In American Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. International 986 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1999),
the appellant filed an adverse possession claim for ownership of a parking lot. The
appellant's suit was the second suit it hadfiledto determine the property rights of the parties
regarding the parking lot. The court analyzed the issue of claim preclusion based on the three
elements stated in Madsen, supra. The court found that the appellant could and should have
brought the adverse possession claim in thefirstsuit. The court stated that claim preclusion
reflects the expectation of the parties who are given the capacity to present their "entire
controversies" shall in fact do so in the same action.
Restatement of the Law, Second, Judgments § 24, has been adopted in Utah. See
Rinswood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cert
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990)).
9

Restatement of the Law, Second, Judgments § 24, states :
(1) When a valid andfinaljudgment rendered in an action extinguishes
the appellant's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar (see §§18,
19), the claim extinguished includes all rights of the appellant to
remedies against the appellee with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the
action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and what
groupings constitute a "series," are to be determined pragmatically,
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in
time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties'
expectations or business understanding or usage.
(emphasis added)
Clearly section 24 ofthe Restatements of Judgments contemplates that when someone
is involved in an automobile accident, claims that arise out of the same set of operative facts
constitute a "transaction," and that all the remedies that arise out of such transaction must be
sought in the first lawsuit. Otherwise Dennis could first bring an action for damage to his
car, then an action for loss of use, then medical bills, lost of income, etc. The purpose of the
claims preclusion doctrine is to ensure that Dennis brings all his claims in one in one suit so
that such claims can be finalized and for the sake of judicial economy.
In the comments and illustrations to section 24 of the Restatement of Judgments, the
same basic fact pattern as has occurred in the present case was illustrated.

10

Illustrations:
1. A and B, driving their respective cars, have a collision injuring A
and damaging his car. The occurrence is single, and so is A's claim.
If A obtains a judgment against B on the ground of negligence for the
damage to the car, he is prevented by the doctrine of merger from
subsequently maintaining an action for the harm to his person.
2. The facts are the same as in Illustration 1, except that B obtains a
judgment on the ground that A has failed to prove B's negligence. The
preclusion is the same, but explained by the doctrine of bar.
Restatements of Judgments Second, § 24, Illustrations 1 and 2.
The same fact pattern above is what occurred with Dennis in the present case.
Dennis sued for property damages in Small Claims Court and at trial a "no cause of action"
judgment was entered. He is bared from bringing a second action for different damages
from the same automobile accident.
Restatements of Judgment, § 24 also includes in the comments § g.
g. When the jurisdiction of the court is limited. The rule stated in this
Section as to splitting a claim is applicable although the first action is
brought in a court which has no jurisdiction to give a judgment for
more than a designated amount. When the plaintiff brings an action in
such a court and recovers judgment for the maximum amount which the
court can award, he is precluded from thereafter maintaining an action
for the balance of his claim. See Illustrations 13 and 15. It is assumed
here that a court was available to the plaintiff in the same system of
courts - say a court of general jurisdiction in the same state - where he
could have sued for the entire amount.
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The comments of Restatements § 24 includes the following illustrations regarding the
above:
Illustration:
13. A bring an action against B for negligently causing his personal
injury. Instead of suing in a court of general jurisdiction of the state, A
brings his action in a court which has no jurisdiction to give a judgment
for more than $500. At the trial A's damages are assessed at $1,000.
Judgment is given for A for $500. A cannot maintain an action against
B to recover further damages.
14. In an automobile collision, A is injured and his car damages as a
result of the negligence of B. Instead of suing in a court of general
jurisdiction of the state, A brings his action for the damage to his car
in a justice's court, which has jurisdiction in actions for damage to
property but has no jurisdiction in actions for injury to the person.
Judgment is rendered for A for the damage to the car. A cannot
thereafter maintain an action against B to recover for the injury to
his person arising out of the same collision. (Emphasis added.)
Dennis cannot split his cause of action for the accident of October 6,2000. When he
brought his lawsuit for property damage in Small Claims Court he was obligated to at the
same time bring an action for personal injuries even if it meant that he had to sue in a
different court, such as the Third District Court, in order to obtain complete relief. At the
time of the filing of the lawsuit in Small Claims Court Dennis had already incurred personal
injuries and all of the medical expenses that are now being claimed in this lawsuit. (R. 66;
Addendum E.) The medical log showing all the medical expenses predating the small claims
action was produced by Dennis in his initial disclosures in this case. (R. 46.)
12

The Supreme Court of Utah has prohibited splitting causes of actions. In Ravmer v.
Hi-Line Transport. Inc.. 15 Utah 2d. 427, 394 P.2d 383 (Utah 1964), the court denied a
Dennis' attempt to institute two actions in two separate proceedings - one for his property
damage and one for his personal injuries. The court stated:
In a substantial majority of jurisdictions, a single act causing
simultaneous injury to the physical person and property of one
individual is held to give rise to only one cause of action, and not to
separate causes based, on the one hand, on the personal injury, and on
the other the property loss.
Id.
The court emphasized that the rule against splitting causes of action benefits both
appellants (freeing them of delay and burdensome expense) and appellees (relieving them
of the injustice of being subjected to more than one suit for a single tort). Id. The court also
found the rule to be in harmony with public policy because it promoted judicial economy by
eliminating the possibility of a multiplicity of suits.
Likewise, in Seale v. Gowans. et al.. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), the court stated that,
"once injury results there is but a single tort and not a series of separate torts, one for each
resultant harm . . . [A] plaintiff may not split this cause of action by seeking damages for
some of his injuries in one suit and for later-developing injuries in another."
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In the majority of jurisdictions the law will not allow splitting a cause of action into
a separate property damage and personal injury claim.2
In the case at hand, Dennis had the opportunity to bring his claim of bodily injury in
the small claims action. His claims of property damage and bodily injury arose out of the
same event, the October 6, 2000 automobile accident. He failed to assert his bodily injury
claims at the same time he sued for property damage, and is now be precludedfrombringing
Vasquez into a second forum to litigate those claims.

2

Kirchnerv.Riherd. 702 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1985) (where an appellant sued for
property damage and loss of use for his automobile in Small Claims Court and then
attempted to bring his bodily injury claim in a higher court because the personal injury
exceeded the small claims jurisdiction and notwithstanding that the trial court did not
reach the question of liability for negligence the claim was barred by the previously filed
action in Small Claims Court); Donahue v. American Family Mut. Cas. Co.. 380 N.W.2d
437 (Iowa App. 1985) (where an insured had brought an earlier action against an insured
in Small Claims Court and that action had been dismissed with a finding that the insured
was not negligent; both actions arose out of the same automobile collision and out of the
insurer's resulting duties under the insurance policy, the subsequent action was barred);
Landry v. Lucher. 976 P.2d 1274 (Wash. App. 1999) (where the court precluding splitting
a cause of action where the plaintiff brought a small claims action for property damage
related claims and later attempted similar claims and medical expense claims in a court of
higher jurisdiction); Pretz v. Lamont 626 P.2d 806 (Kan. App. 1981), the appellate court
affirmed dismissal of a subsequent action for injuries where appellant had already
obtained a judgment for property damage; McKibben v. Zamora, 358 So.2d 866 (Fla.
App. 1978), the appellate court disallows the splits of property damage action and
personal injury action arising out of the same accident and specifically held that res
judicata applies even if plaintiff had not met "threshold" for filing a personal injury claim
at the time the property damage claim was filed.
14

C.

The Small Claims Judgment Is Final And On The Merits

Under Madsen, supra., the third requirement for claim preclusion is that there be a
final judgment on the merits in the prior action. Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures defines judgment as "a decree and in the orderfromwhich an appeal lies."
Under claim preclusion, there is no requirement that the common issue to both actions
actually be litigated. Whether the judgment is by trial or from a motion to dismiss that is
granted with prejudice, or by summary judgment, the resulting judgment would be on the
merits. Conderv.Hunt 1 P.3d 558 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
In the instant case, a judgment was entered and an appeal was available to Dennis.
The Small Claims Court entered judgment on the merits based on the finding of no cause of
action.
II.

EQUITY DOES NOT FAVOR ALLOWING THIS APPELLANT AN
EXCEPTION TO THE CLAIMS PRECLUSION DOCTRINE.

Dennis argues that the Court, under equitable principles, should carve out an
exception to the claims preclusion branch of res judicata for small claims actions.
Dennis' argument is essentially based on a minority of jurisdictions that have provided
such an exception. Dennis cites several cases including Isaac v. Truck Services, Inc., 253
Conn. 418 (Conn. 2000).

15

However, the facts of those cases and Isaac are substantially different from the present
case. Isaac was decided on the basis that the plaintiff had not yet treated for personal injuries
before her property damage claim was brought in Small Claims Court two weeks after the
accident. Isaac, at 419. The court was basing its decision in Isaac on the fact that there was
no injury claim yet to be asserted at the time the small claims action was filed.
Furthermore, in Isaac the court pointed to the fact that public policy in Connecticut
had already provided for a limited exception to the claims preclusion doctrine "based on
claims between married persons." Isaac, at 420.
The present case is entirely different. In Utah the public policy is to not allow claims
to be split nor to provide exceptions to the claims preclusion doctrine. See, Raymer, supra.:
International, supra.
Furthermore, the facts in the present case strongly suggest Dennis should not be
granted "equity" to carve out a limited exception.
Prior to filing the small claims action, Dennis had retained the very attorneys who
represented him in the present case. (R.65; R. 66, p. 2, lines 20-25; p. 3, lines 1-8; p. 12,
lines 10-25, p. 13, lines 1-25.) In fact, Dennis' paralegal went with him to the small claims
action as an interpreter. (R. 95, p. 13.) Dennis most certainly could have brought his lawsuit
for injuries. A cause of action accrues at the time of the accident regardless of whether
16

plaintiff has sustained sufficient medical expenses to meet threshold. See Jepson v. State.
846 P.2d 485 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the small claims
action Dennis had not only been treating but had finished treating. (R. 66; Addendum E.)
Prior to the small claims action, liability was in dispute between Dennis' attorneys
and Vasquez. (R. 65; Addendum A.) Regardless of the dispute, Dennis received some
$4,650 for his property damage claims. (R. 30,35,79,95 p. 12, lines 1-19.) This represents
80 percent of the property damage. (R. 95, p. 12, lines 1-19.) Dennis then attempted to sue
for the remaining $1,227.35 in Small Claims Court. However, at Small Claims Court a "no
cause of action" judgment was entered against Dennis.
The significance of the above is clear. If Dennis had won the extra 20 percent liability
he was seeking and a judgment had been entered on Dennis' behalf he would have been the
one arguing and demandingfromVasquez 100 percent of the personal injury damages on the
disputed liability. Instead, he lost at Small Claims Court and a final judgment was entered
on the merits.
Dennis is not being punished because of the inequity of the court system. Dennis
claim is being precluded by res judicata because he tried to misuse the system. He tried to
use the small claims process in an attempt to later argue he should get 100 percent of his
injury damages. Now that such tactic has backfired, Dennis requests equity. This is hardly
17

the set of facts the court in Isaac, supra., found so compelling. At the time Dennis filed in
Small Claims Court there was absolutely no reason why he could not have brought his
personal injury claim other than he was attempting to manipulate the system. Dennis has
"unclean hands" in his request for equity.
In Donahue v. American Family Mut. Cas. Co.. 380 N.W.2d 437 (Ct. App. Iowa
1985), the plaintiff brought two separate small claims actions based upon the same accident.
The plaintiff was attempting to split his claims against different parties and lost both small
claims actions for property damage related claims. The plaintiff did not appeal the small
claims judgments. The plaintiff thenfileda claim at the trial court level for property damage
and medical expenses. The trial court granted summary judgment and the appeals court
affirmed on the principle of claim preclusion.
In Donahue, supra., at 439, the court held:
We are not unmindful of the fact that plaintiff could not have brought
an action for $10,000 in Small Claims Court. But that does not negate
the legal principles requiring a party to put in issue and try his entire
claim at one time and not litigate separate claims in separate actions.
This outcome demonstrates the harsh results of a misuse of the small
claims process.
In Landry, supra., the appellate court did not allow the splitting of a cause of action
into property and personal injury claims holding that the plaintiffs small claims action bars
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a subsequent lawsuit for personal injuries under res judicata. The court in Landry dismissed
plaintiffs equity arguments:
The Landrys make several equitable arguments. Equitable remedies are
not available unless the remedies at law are inadequate. Here the morethan-adequate legal remedy was to join the personal injury claim with
the property damage claim in a court with the jurisdictional authority
to preside over both matters up to the full amount of damages in
controversy.
Landry, supra., at 785-86.
Lastly, Dennis never argued that an exception should be carved out of res judicata for
small claims and never listed his out-of-state cases in his docketing statement. Dennis should
not now be allowed for thefirsttime to argue that an "equity" exception should be provided.
See Olson, supra.
CONCLUSION
Under Madsen, supra.. Dennis essentially admits that under claim preclusion
principles res judicata applies to bar Dennis' claims.
Dennis argues rather that under equity principles he should be allowed to split his
cause of action. However, under the facts of this case, even if equity is considered, Dennis
cannot prevail. Dennis attempted to misuse the small claims process to litigate a claim for
property damages which he knew had already been settled. He wanted to adjudicate the
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remaining 20 percent of fault to use as an argument in his personal injury claim. When he
lost he did not appeal and the judgment became final. Dennis had legal representation the
entire time. Dennis had not only received medical treatment but had completed medical
treatment before filing in Small Claims Court. There is no reason given the facts in this case
why Dennis could not have brought his injury and property damage claims in one action.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that Dennis' appeal be denied based on the
claims preclusion doctrine of res judicata.
DATED this Ko day of December, 2002.
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

RICHARD K. GLAUSER
ALBERT W. GRAY
Attorneys for Vasquez
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Vasquez was
mailed first class mail, postage prepaid, this I / day of December, 2002, to the following:
Michael A. Katz, #3817
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5664 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
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Julio Sandoval
STATE FARM INSURANCE
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Dear Julio
In response to your letter of November 2, 2000,1 have enclosed for your review a
copy of our liability review attached with photos of the scene of the accident.
Deputy Watkin's report expressed his opinion based on the scene observations and
interviews with the two drivers and eyewitness He indicates that Vasquez's failure to yield the
right of way caused the collision
Karl Hayes the eyewitness who was stopped behind your insured at the stop sign,
is remarkable only for his observation that he thought Mr Torrez was coming "a littlejfast'* (SR140 is posted for 45MPH) That is not evidence of speeding as you suggest
It is clear that the proximate cause of the collision was the failure of your insured
to see Mr Torrez approaching and his failure to yield the right of way Therefore, we request
you review these items and make an accurate assessment of liability
Sincerely,
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

Mitchell H Jensen \
MRJ/jrm

HON 1 ' >

m

TabB

f

n-*^

* HAND DtLiVERED;

Third District Court, State of Utah /d^A A/^+«>

-CAVED BY

.icCaVEDBY
AR 1 ?• ' '

SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107

''

FMsisvwcwfcWR 1 3 2001
Nam* ^-J-<t~//4

, Plaintiff)
)

/J^AJA''^

Agent & Title
Street Address #}£*>?•$
?£& Y^
r i t y > n t r 7 ; r J * ,vA, . ^ 7 - g y * » ^

SMALIrCLAlMS
AFFIDAVIT

)

Phone j g g f c z i ^

AND ORDER

,*

vs.
\'a™«

/J#-tf,r/
T

kn^S/si

lk\<fsrr^

nefp„rlnr>t ) Case No. Q \ p - - > T " Q ' & < -

J

' Social Securfty"Ts ufnb"e'r"- *„.'• '":'•"*".:
——:—'JUL ------- ' ")
Agent & Title .
_ _ )
A
Street Address ??/ £<->• M* /
)
City, State, Zip/^W>;' ^ 7 " " %V
P h o n e d ? / - ?&r?j

—

" --- -

~v

.
AFFIDAVIT
Plaintiff swears that the following is'true:
(1) Defendant owes plaintiff $
plus a filing fee and a service fee.
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(2) Plaintiff has asked defendant to pay the debt, but it has not been paid.
(3) Defendant resides OR the claim arose within the jurisdiction of this court.
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ORDER
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE DEFENDANT:
You are directed to appear at a trial and answer the above claim on:
Date: y - y ^ y g - t r ^ V * ^<^\ j7pT\
, Time
^ V ^ V ^ *Car^VPlace: 5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107 (west entrance)
Dated T - ^ - N
Tf « * ~ * . * - - » -

J?X

.20.CLL.

;l

——Ht—^> - ^ N -

Clerk or Deputy

: ^

TabC

W'

Hiix a District Court, State of Ltah
Salt Lake County, Murray Department
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Plaintiff
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JUDGMENT

Agent & Title
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City, State, Zip

Daytime Phone

David Xavier Vasquez

, Defendant

Name
Case No..

018200663

Social Security Number
Agent & Title
Street address
City, State, Zip
DATE OF TRIAL:.

Daytime Phone
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PARTffiS APPEARING:

3-29-01
tyl

Plaintiff

^

Defendant

THE COURT ORDERS JUDGMENT AS F O L L O W S : ^
] FORPLADfTIFF

[ ] FOR DEFENDANT ON COUNTER AFFIDAVIT

$

.Principal
.Court Costs
.Total Judgment, with interest at the current state post-judgment rate, until paid.

$_.

4 . FOR DEFENDANT

[ ] FOR PLAINTIFF ON COUNTER AFFIDAVIT

V ] No Cause of Action
[ ] Dismissal with Prejudice (claim may not be refiled)
[ ] Dismissal without Prejudice (claim may be refiled)
lis judgment is effective for 8 \ears.

RECEIVED

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
(ORIGINAL TO BE FILED WITH COURT)

APR 0 i 2001
this date I certify that I
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^

[^delivered a copy of this Judgment to

[

flCglaintifF
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Richard K. Glauser, #4324
Albert W. Gray, #A6095
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (609) 466-4228
Attorneys for Defendant

MAY - 6 2002
/s^L^LAKECfauNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ILIA DENNIS,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID VASQUEZ,
Defendant.

Civil No. 010906455
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

The above-captioned case came before the Court pursuant to Defendant's motion
for summary judgment on March 18, 2002. Albert W. Gray appeared on behalf of the
moving party, the Defendant, David Vasquez, and Michael A. Katz appeared on behalf of
the Plaintiff.
This matter arises out of an automobile accident occurring on October 6, 2000. On
July 19, 2001, Plaintiff filed his complaint. Subsequently Defendant's insurer State Farm
reached a settlement agreement with Plaintiff and paid him $4,650.06. On February 23,
2001, Plaintiff filed a small claims action in the Third District Court in the amount of
$1,227.35 for property damage as a result of the accident. On March 23, 2001, the court
in the small claims action entered judgment against Plaintiff stating that there was "no

Madsen v. Borthick , 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), sets forth the requirements for
claims preclusion under res judicata:
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that
cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy three
requirements. First, both cases must involve the same parties or their
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have
been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should
have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 247, 247 (Utah 1988).
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, it is undisputed the first
requirement in Madsen is met. As for the second factor, the Restatement of Judgments
§ 24 provides:
The rule stated in this Section as to splitting a claim is applicable
although the first action is brought in a court which has no jurisdiction
to give a judgment for more than a designated amount. When the
plaintiff brings an action in such a court and recovers judgment for the
maximum amount which the court can award, he is precluded from
thereafter maintaining an action for the balance of his claim ... it is
assumed here that a court was available to the plaintiff in the same
system of courts.
In the instant matter, while exceeding the jurisdiction of the small claims court, there
is no dispute the personal injuries and expenses related thereto were already incurred and
should have been brought together - even if they had to be filed in district court.
Furthermore, although the small claims court found there was "no cause of action,"
plaintiff could not re-file his action and he failed to appeal. Consequently, this decision is
one on the merits and not based solely on jurisdiction as argued by plaintiff.
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The Court, having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits attached thereto,
and for good cause shown and based upon the foregoing including the Court's
Memorandum Decision of March 25, 2002, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

Defendants motion for summary judgment is granted.

DATED this o

day of ^jtf^T

, 2002.
BY THE

The Honorable Glenn K.|iw2rsfKi^,^
Third District Court Judge, \ % # ^ V
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